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Abstract
This paper extends the framework provided by De Grauwe, Dewachter and Aksoy
(1998). Monetary policy e¤ectiveness of the European Central Bank (ECB) in the
open economy Euroland is addressed. The optimal feedback rules for the member
states with the use of the backward looking variables are derived. The role of the real
exchange rate is discussed. For alternative voting mechanisms in the ECB Govern-
ing Council we simulate the monetary policy e¤ectiveness and provide some welfare
analysis.
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1 Introduction
The European Central Bank (ECB) started to act as of 1.1.1999. This institutional change
will have substantial implications on the international money environment.
First of all, the introduction of the Euro altered the monetary policy of all the partic-
ipating countries in the EMU project. Countries cannot conduct independent monetary
policies, but have to rely on the decisions of the ECB Governing Council. Secondly, mon-
etary policy is not immune from the price and output (employment) developments in the
rest of the world. In this sense, foreign exchange rates play a role in the identi…cation of the
level of uncertainties in the international economic relations. Therefore, this new economic
environment brings about strong challenges about the real value of the Euro, which will
likely reveal the heterogenous structure of the member countries. The aim of the paper is
to focus on the monetary policy of the Euroland in the open economy environment and to
address some potential con‡icts at the ECB Governing Council.
The Maastricht Treaty provides a framework that underlies the priorities of the ECB.
The Treaty sets price stability as the primary objective of the ECB. The bulk of the
economic literature agrees that ECB can work e¢ciently, if and only if countries consti-
tuting the EMU are more or less symmetric, i.e. share identical or very similar economic
structures, monetary transmission mechanisms and national policy preferences. Recent
research on the European integration process has documented that economies of EMU
member states di¤er structurally.
Eleven countries that are constituting the EMU face at least three types of asymmetries.
First of all, 11 countries in the EMU di¤er in the structure of their economies. Thus, the
economic shocks, say in‡ation or output, are not perfectly correlated across countries.
Secondly, evidence during the transition period into EMU suggest that target variables
have responded to a change in the monetary policy (i.e. short term interest rates) in each
of the member state in a di¤erent way. That is to say, the propagation of the monetary
policy induced shocks (interest rates) were not synchronized across countries. Accordingly,
optimal national monetary feedback rules should be di¤erent across countries. Thirdly,
policymakers preferences in the conduct of the monetary policy seemed to be di¤erent.1
These asymmetries will be carried over to Euroland level. Obvious platform of potential
tensions is the ECB Governing Council, the chief executive body of European monetary
policymaking. The ECB Governing Council (GC) will consists of eleven national represen-
tatives and six members of the ECB Board, which will vote upon the suitable monetary
policy for the Euroland as a whole. If at least in the initial phase of the EMU the cur-
rent structure of asymmetries will continue to hold, the ECB may fail to satisfy all of its
’shareholders’ interests and may face obstacles in the conduct of the monetary policy.
Surprisingly, the current stream of analysis focused on the likely impact of the switch
from national currencies to the euro was mainly neglecting the fact that Europe as a
whole is a large open economy. So far little analysis explore the role of international
1This hardly veri…able feature of national monetary policy is mainly a matter of ideology and political
ambitions. In economic research it is usually taken as an exogenous parameter.
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spillovers of a particular monetary policy rule the ECB will use upon starting to act. 2
If the underlying asymmetric dynamics that determine the current economic states lead
to divergent price and output developments in the Euroland regions, at least one reliable
measure of external competitiveness, from now onwards ”post-Euro real exchange rates”,
may further complicate the conduct the monetary policy at the GC.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses some evidence in line with Tay-
lor rules and sketches the model for optimal feedback rules. Section 3 contains empirical
analysis. Section 4 contains the models for alternative voting schemes we consider. Sec-
tion 5 presents results for the simulation exercise for the Euroland and provide welfare
discussion. Finally, section 6 concludes.
2 An Open Economy Model
The Creation of Euroland motivated extensive research. The focus was the source and the
size of the asymmetries inherent within this heterogeneous institution. The literature doc-
uments at least four types of asymmetries. First of all, economies constitute the Euroland
di¤er in terms of the set-up of their economic institutions and the specialization and loca-
tion of their production activity. In other words, di¤erences in the production, …nancial and
labor markets a¤ect crucially their relative position of their economic states. Among oth-
ers, studies by Bayoumi and Prasad (1995) point to the strong country speci…c component
in the variability of industrial activities.3 Secondly, and related to the former argument,
output shocks are not necessarily synchronized across the Euroland countries inducing fur-
ther diversi…cation of output and in‡ation developments. Thirdly, econometric evidence
stresses the asymmetric nature of the monetary transmission mechanism. Among others,
Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1997), Dornbusch, Favero and Giavazzi (1998), Ramaswamy
and Sloek (1998), Peersman and Smets (1998), Giovannetti and Marimon (1998), Kieler
and Saarenheimo (1998) and De Grauwe et al. (1998) reported asymmetries in the size
and timing of monetary transmission across European countries.4
According to an in‡uential paper by Taylor (1993), Central Bank’s policy reactions can
be deduced from a simple policy rule. His argument relies on the US Fed evidence under
Greenspan chairmanship, where he derives a rough rule of thumb for the US monetary
policy. Although Taylor rules are criticized substantially or updated according to new
evidence, simple policy rules are by now subject to extensive research. The main motivation
of the interest in such rules are their easy interpretation. If de…ned correctly any central
banks policy action can be traced easily from such rules. Naturally, one expects that
Central Banks make use of a wider information when they change their policy actions. As
Rudebusch and Svensson (1998) put it:
2With the notable exceptions of Weerapana (1998), Peersman and Smets (1998) and Svensson (1998b).
3For analysis of the asymmetries see also Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1992).
4Note that these accounts do not always support each other. Results crucially depend on the identi…ca-
tion scheme of monetary shocks, data and type of modelling. For a critical analysis of the current research
on monetary transmission mechanisms, see Kieler and Saarenheimo (1998).
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Every central bank uses more information than the simple rules are based
on, and no central bank would voluntarily restrict itself to react mechanically
in a predescribed way to new information. The role of unrestricted or simple
explicit instrument rules is at best to provide a baseline and comparison to the
policy actually followed.
In reality, a quick look at the literature suggests that a simple Taylor rule performs
quite well in replicating most of the central banks’ monetary policy actions. 5 At least
there seems to be a slowly growing consensus that such a rule can be a useful benchmark
in evaluating monetary policy actions.
In this paper, we will study a backwards looking version of the Rudebusch and Svensson
(1998) and Svensson (1998) model. This dynamic programming framework allows us to
derive country speci…c optimal feedback rules. Naturally, Lucas critique is particularly
relevant in our model, since we will assume throughout the paper that the agents’ decision
rules will be invariant with respect to the changing monetary environment. Although
recent research, in particular Fuhrer (1997a), provided some evidence in favor of backwards
looking speci…cations of Phillips curve with respect to its forward looking counterparts, we
do not claim any immunity to Lucas critique.6
In a closed economy framework, backward looking behavior implies the aggregate de-
mand channel of transmission of policy changes. (See also Svensson, 1998) More explicitly,
a change in the monetary policy a¤ects the aggregate demand with some lags which is
likely passing through the …nancial sector (e.g. credit channel). In‡ation is then a¤ected
by the change in the aggregate demand. Thus, Phillips curve is a¤ected via the change in
the monetary policy through its e¤ect on the production decisions.
In the open economy case, however, we have additional channels of the transmission of
policy changes into the aggregate economy. Indirect channels works via production process.
The real exchange rate a¤ects the relative price between the domestic and foreign goods.
Hence, the aggregate demand is a¤ected by the changes in the external competitiveness.
Phillips Curve, i.e. the aggregate supply equation is then indirectly a¤ected by the changes
in the aggregate demand (i.e. via the production decisions of the domestic …rms). On the
other hand, real exchange rate induced changes in the input prices are obviously another
channel of transmission of policy, which in turn a¤ects the costs of production and hence
prices. Finally, shocks on the foreign demand for domestic goods will a¤ect the aggregate
domestic demand and hence aggregate supply. The second type of channel has a direct
impact on the Phillips Curve. (through the aggregate supply equation). Since, depending
on the openness of the economy, the domestic …nal goods prices are directly a¤ected by
the changes in the real exchange rates, the CPI in‡ation is a function of the real exchange
rates. However, for that purpose one needs to model the real exchange rates with the use of
expectations for the real exchange rates. This clearly requires incorporation of the forward
looking variables. In this paper, for the sake of the internal consistency of our model,
5See Svensson (1998), Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1997), Peersman and Smets (1998).
6For forward looking closed economy models consult Svensson (1998), Rotemberg and Woodford (1997)
and Fuhrer (1997b).
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we will neglect the direct channels of monetary transmission mechanism on the in‡ation
process and focus on the indirect channels of monetary policy transmission mechanism.7
More precisely, our model consists of an aggregate supply equation in the form of an
autoregressive Phillips curve given by:
¼t =
nX
j=1
®¼;j¼t¡j + ®yyt¡1 + "t; (1)
Equation (1) shows that aggregate supply equation is an autoregressive process, which take
into account changes in the aggregate demand with one period lag. Note that the variables
¼t; yt; qt represent the in‡ation rate, excess demand (output gap) and real exchange rate,
respectively. "t is zero mean i.i.d. random shock. Aggregate demand equation has features
of a partial-adjustment IS curve and is given such that:
yt =
11X
j=1
¯y;jyt¡j ¡ ¯i (¹it ¡ ¹¼t) +
11X
j=1
¯q;j¢qt¡j + ´t: (2)
where excess demand yt is measured as deviations from its output trend component. ´t
is i.i.d. zero mean random shock. Equation (2) represents aggregate demand equation as
an autoregressive process, which takes into account immediate and past policy changes via
the moving average of real interest rate (¹it ¡ ¹¼t) and external competitiveness variable,
lagged changes in the real exchange rates ¢q0s. In equation (2) ; ¹it and ¹¼t represent a
twelve month moving arithmetic average of current and past interest and in‡ation rates.
More precisely:
¹it = 1= (12)
11X
i=0
it¡i and ¹¼t = 1=12
11X
i=0
¼t¡i:
Next we have to write our exchange rate process. We specify the standard expression
for the real exchange rate (in natural logarithms) as being:
qt = st + p
¤
t ¡ pt (3)
where st stands for the nominal exchange rate, p¤ for the foreign price level and p for the
domestic price level. We assume that the exchange rate satis…es the uncovered interest
parity condition such that:
it ¡ i¤t + Àt =[E[st+1]¡ st+1]| {z }
&t+1
+[st+1 ¡ st] (4)
7Note that, in their seminal papers Meese and Rogo¤ (1983 and 1988) provide an important test of the
existing real exchange rate models. They …nd that the simple random walk model outperforms all existing
real exchange rate models. They also …nd that the real interest rate di¤erentials exhibit the theoretically
anticipated sign, while being insigni…cant. Thus, here we will opt for a simpli…ed case in order to avoid
problems that could arise with the use of expectations.
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where &t+1 is the forecast error at time t+1 and Àt is the risk premium at time t. Then, we
can rewrite equation (4) in terms of changes. By taking …rst di¤erences and substituting
equation (4) into (3) we can write real exchange rate changes as being:
¢qt+1 = it ¡ i¤t + ¼¤t+1 ¡ ¼t+1 + Àt ¡ & t+1 (5)
In other words, equation (5) states that changes in the real exchange rates at time t is
nothing but the sum of the current in‡ation di¤erential, one period lagged interest rate
di¤erential and a risk premium minus a forecast error of the nominal exchange rate. We also
assume that the foreign in‡ation and the foreign interest rate follow stationary univariate
AR(1) process such that:
¼¤t = ±¼
¤
t¡1 + Ã
¤
t (6)
i¤t = ½i
¤
t¡1 + º
¤
t (7)
where 0 < ± < 1; 0 < ½ < 1 and Ã¤t and º
¤
t are i.i.d: zero mean random shocks. Obviously,
these assumptions are for simpli…cation purposes and can be relaxed in more realistic ways
to account for the external economies.8
Hence, we can now summarize the monetary transmission mechanism implied by equa-
tions (1) ; (2) and (5) : Essentially, by assuming uncovered interest parity we endogenize
the real exchange rate process. In other words, we allow the policy variable (interest rates)
to a¤ect the real exchange rates.
If there is a change in the policy instrument, the short term interest rate, the aggregate
demand for domestic goods is a¤ected immediately. In the next period, the aggregate
supply is a¤ected via the aggregate demand channel. On the other hand, if there is a
shock on the external competitiveness as speci…ed by the changes in the real exchange rate,
aggregate demand is a¤ected at the current period and aggregate supply a period after.
We expect that a real exchange rate depreciation a¤ects aggregate demand positively at
the initial stage, i.e. 0 < ¯q;t¡1 < 1: This means that, ceteris paribus, an increase in
the external competitiveness tends to create a positive output gap given that we are at
the equilibrium at the initial period. Capacity overutilization a¤ects domestic in‡ation
positively, thus ®y > 0:
There are basically two opposing e¤ects, which we will call the real exchange rate
channel and real interest rate channel. Real exchange rate channel works as follows. If
there is an increase in the policy variable (interest rate) at time t, aggregate demand is
dampened and in‡ation tends to decline at period t + 1. Real exchange rate tends to
depreciate from our identity (5) and external competitiveness increases, hence aggregate
demand at time t + 2. At the same time real interest channel is at work. At time t + 2;
in‡ation decline leads to an increase in the moving average of real interest rates, hence
triggering a decrease in the output gap. Therefore, overall outcome of an policy induced
change in the macroeconomic aggregates is ambiguous.
8By calculating the optimal feedback rules and throughout the simulations in section 5 we e¤ectively
set ± and ½ as being to 0.99, to assure convergence. We do not model the risk premium and e¤ectively set
it as being zero.
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2.1 State Space Representation
In this paper we will make use of the dynamic optimization framework provided by Rude-
busch and Svensson (1998) and Svensson (1998a,b) with backward looking variables. We
assume that the intertemporal loss function takes the following form:
Et
1X
¿=0
±¿Lt+¿ : (8)
Let Yt be the (1 x n1) vector of target variables and K the matrix of preferences. When
the discount rate ± ! 1; the intertemporal loss function is equivalent to the unconditional
mean of the period loss functions and can be written as:
Lt = Yt
0KYt: (9)
where Yt =
264 ¼y
it ¡ it¡1
375 : We do not assume a Central Bank aiming to stabilize the real
exchange rates, as is done in Ball (1997). Thus in our set up, the Central Bank does not
use a Monetary Condition Index, a composite of exchange rate and interest rate changes,
to react to changes in the real exchange rate. Real exchange rate changes enter the state
space as an identity (UIP) and the short term nominal interest rate is the unique policy
variable of the Central Bank to a¤ect macroeconomic aggregates.
A conventional way to describe the dynamics of economic state is given as:
Xt = AXt¡1 +Bit¡1 + vt; (10)
where Xt
³
¼t; yt; qt; ¼
¤
t ; it¡1; i
¤
t¡1
´
is a (1 x n1) vector of economic state variables, A is the
(n1 x n1) parameter matrix, it is the vector of the central bank instrument variables, B is
the (1 x n2) column vector and vt+1 is a vector of exogenous i.i.d. shocks with zero mean
and constant covariance matrix.9
After some manipulations in line with Rudebusch and Svensson(1998) we can write the
optimal linear feedback rule as being:
it = fXt (11)
where
f = ¡(R + ±B0V B)¡1(U 0 + ¯B0V A) (12)
representing the optimal feedback coe¢cients.
Dynamics of the state variable can now be rewritten using the optimal feedback rule.
Substituting it in (10) with optimal feedback vector f given in (12) ; we rewrite (10) as:
Xt+1 = A+Bf + vt+1 (13)
9See appendix 1, for the formulation of the appropriate matrices.
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3 Empirical Results
3.1 Data
Our empirical work is based on the monthly data taken from the IMF International Fi-
nancial Statistics. Our estimation results are based on the time period 1979.01-1994.09.10
We use logarithm of industrial production as a proxy for output. Output gap is gener-
ated via detrending the raw industrial production series by Hodrick Prescott …lter, where
¸ = 500000 equivalent to a linear trending. In‡ation data is the monthly CPI (converted
in annual rate) data for the 11 countries in the EMU11. In order to calculate real exchange
rates we use the end of period monthly nominal exchange vis-a-vis the US dollar, US price
level and price levels of the 11 countries in the Euro project. Monthly changes in the real
exchange rates exhibit high volatility. Finally, short term interest rates for the Euroland
countries with the exceptions of Finland (average lending rate), Ireland (STF rate) and
Portugal (lending rate). We further assume that in Luxembourg the Belgian short term
interest rate holds.
3.2 Estimation
We estimate equations (1) and (2). Conventional literature on aggregate supply equation
imposes the ad hoc long term restriction on the in‡ation coe¢cients. We test this theo-
retical argument for long term money neutrality. We …nd signi…cant evidence against the
null hypothesis of monetary neutrality within the sample period concerned.12 We further
test the stability of the matrix A and check the eigenvalues. We observe that for a num-
ber of countries eigenvalues are not necessarily within the unitary circle. Thus, for the
sake of the subsequent simulation analysis in the following section we opt for the results
of the unrestricted aggregate supply estimation (1) and derive the optimal feedback rule
accordingly. (See table 1 for the statistical report).
For most of the countries moving average variable in the aggregate demand equation (2)
exhibits the theoretically anticipated sign. In other words, when the moving average of real
interest rates increases, output gap decreases albeit not always signi…cant. The same holds
for the output gap variable in the aggregate supply equation (1). Capacity overutilization (a
positive gap) leads to an increase in the in‡ation rate, whereas a capacity underutilisation
has the opposite e¤ect.
10Note that we restrict our attention on this period, because some output data in particular for Portugal
was not consistently available after 1994.09.
11Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal and
Spain.
12Theoretical presumption is that monetary changes can not have permanent e¤ects, thus
P11
j=1 ¼t¡j = 1
in equation (1). In order to see whether this hypothesis holds for our sample of countries, we also imposed
the long term restriction and applied the Wald test (joint F -test). We could reject for a number of
countries the hypothesis of long term monetary neutrality at the 99% interval (for Austria, Germany,
Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands and Portugal). Therefore, we have opted not to impose long term
restrictions on the coe¢cients. (see Table 1).
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Table 1: Stability Tests
Aus Bel Fin Fra Ger Ire Ita Lux Net Por Spa
A matrix Max.EV (res) .99 1.00 1.01 1.00 1.011 .99 1.01 .996 1.01 1.01 1.00
A matrix Max.EV (unres1) .94 .98 .97 .96 .92 .92 .99 .94 .98 .94 .99
M matrix Max EV (unres1) .93 .98 .99 .97 .99 .94 .94 .95 .95 .96 .98
M matrix Max EV (unres2) .93 .98 .99 .98 .99 .95 .95 .96 .96 .97 .98
M matrix Max EV (unres3) .93 .98 .99 .98 .99 .95 .95 .96 .96 .97 .98
We present only the maximum eigenvalues of the A and M matrices.
First and 2nd rows provide maximum Eigenvalue of the A matrices
of the restricted (i.e.
P11
j=1 ¼t¡j = 1) and unrestricted aggregate
supply equation whereas 3rd, 4th and 5th rows refer to stability of
M matrices of the unrestricted equation with output stabilization
preference parameter of ¸ = :2; ¸ = 1:0 and ¸ = 5:0 respectively.
3.2.1 Monetary Policy Changes
We present the output and in‡ation reactions with respect to a temporary one percent
interest rate change at …gures 1 and 2. Our results are qualitatively in line with De Grauwe
et al. (1998). We observe that in all the countries, but Belgium, Ireland and Luxembourg,
in‡ation reacts with the anticipated sign. In the case of output gap responses exception is
Portugal. Portuguese output gap is positively a¤ected by an increase in the interest rate.
For the rest of the sample coe¢cients are right, hence when the interest rate increases
output and in‡ation decrease. We …nd systematically stronger response of the output than
in‡ation with respect to policy changes. In general, in‡ation reactions are inert and small
across the board. Price puzzle exists in Belgium, Ireland and Luxembourg, in other words,
an increase in the interest rate leads to a slight increase in the in‡ation rate.13
Moreover, the size and timing of the reaction of in‡ation and output di¤ers substantially
across countries. In particular, in Finland, France, Germany and Netherlands both output
and in‡ation seem to be rather less responsive with respect to policy changes. On the other
hand, in Austria, Belgium, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg and Portugal output reactions are
more pronounced.
insert here …gures 1-2
3.2.2 Real Exchange Rate Shocks
We present in …gures 3-4, the reactions of output and in‡ation in the Euroland with
respect to a 1% positive shock on real exchange rate changes. Starting from the steady
state, a real depreciation of the home currency increases aggregate demand for the goods
produced domestically and hence triggers positive output gap. In the subsequent period, an
increase in the aggregate demand for domestic goods a¤ects in‡ation positively. However,
an increase in the in‡ation rate leads to two opposing e¤ects. A real exchange rate channel
13See Christiano et al.(1994) on this issue.
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and a real interest rate channel. First, in‡ation leads to an appreciation of the domestic
currency and hence a dampening of the competitiveness of individual countries. Second, it
leads to a decline in the moving average of real interest rates and an improvement in the
competitive position of countries.
In most of the countries output reactions with respect to real exchange rate shocks are as
expected and positive at the initial phase. There are some exceptions however. In particular
in Portugal, both in‡ation and output reactions exhibit theoretically unanticipated signs.
In comparison to output reactions, in‡ation reactions are unanimously weak across the
board implying strong price rigidity with respect to changes in the real exchange rate. This
can be interpreted as evidence for imperfect pass through of real exchange rate shocks to
the domestic prices at an aggregate price level.14
insert here …gures 3-4
During the propagation of the shocks two opposing channels, real interest rate channel
and real exchange rate channel seem to be at work. Initial competitiveness gains (because
of a depreciation of the real exchange rate) seem to be reversed by the real appreciation in
some countries and leads to a decline in output and in‡ation in the following periods. (e.g.
Belgium, Finland, France, Germany) In some other countries the real interest rate decline
seems to be superior to the real exchange rate appreciation. (e.g. Spain, Italy, Ireland,
Netherlands) Thus, our results are mixed.
3.2.3 AD and AS Shocks
Throughout …gures we plot the reactions of the economies w.r.t. aggregate demand (AD)
and supply shocks (AS). Overall output and in‡ation reactions with respect to a 1% positive
AD or AS shock seem to converge rather quick. As one would expect an increase in the
demand for the domestically produced goods (positive AD Shock) increases output gap and
hence in‡ation. The price puzzle for Belgium, Luxembourg and Ireland become obvious
here. The interaction term ®y exhibits wrong sign and in‡ation reactions are perverse,
in other words with respect to positive output shocks domestic in‡ation decreases. Again
our two opposing e¤ects, real exchange rate e¤ect and real interest rate e¤ect, are at
work. A positive shock on the in‡ation equation leads to an increase in in‡ation across the
board. An increase in the domestic in‡ation rate should lead to an appreciation of the real
exchange rate in the following period, thus a decline in the external competitiveness and a
decrease in output. At the same time the real interest rate e¤ect works via AD equation.
The moving average of real interest rates declines and has a positive impact on production
decisions. A look at the …gures suggest that in general the real interest rate channel seems
to dominate and the output gap is positively a¤ected.
insert here …gures 5-8
14For a similar analysis see Peersman and Smets (1998).
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3.2.4 Optimal Feedback Rules
We present …rst (period) optimal feedback rules throughout …gures 9 to 12 for the inter-
mediate output stabilization case.15 Our results are basically in line with De Grauwe et
al. (1998) for di¤erent parameter speci…cations. First of all, interest rate smoothing para-
meter tends to decline with the higher weight given to output stabilization. This basically
implies that the high output stabilization intention makes interest rates more volatile. Sec-
ondly, output coe¢cients are strongly dominating in‡ation coe¢cients. This feature does
not change across di¤erent preference speci…cations. If we look at the …rst feedback coef-
…cients in intermediate output stabilization case, where ¸ = 1; ° = 0:5; we do not observe
clear-cut Taylor rules. Portugal exhibits wrong sign on the output coe¢cients. Thirdly,
optimal feedback coe¢cients on the changes in the real exchange rates are low and …rst
coe¢cients are in general positive.
insert here …gures 9-12
3.2.5 Speci…cation of the Asymmetric Shocks
Country speci…c in‡ation and output shocks are assumed to be captured by the residuals
of their respective regressions (1) and (2). In order to see how this shocks comove across
countries within the Euroland, we write for the pairwise correlation among the residuals:
sxy =
P
i
³
´
xi
¡ ´x
´ ³
´
yi
¡ ´y
´
n¡ 1 : (14)
Thus, for the covariance matrix of the European Union 11 we can write S = [sij] : A
useful decomposition of the matrix S is the Cholesky decomposition S = LL0; where L
representing the lower triangular matrix.
4 An Asymmetric Euroland: Framework for Simula-
tions
Previous sections presented an attempt to account for the structural asymmetries across
Euroland countries. In this section we will provide a simulation analysis on the likely
functioning of the ECB and its macroeconomic implications. In the following sections we
present the framework for the statistical and institutional asymmetries which will be used
in the simulations.
4.1 Statistical Aspects
Three types of asymmetries will be incorporated into our simulations. First of all we
assume that in‡ation and output shocks will continue to comove as de…ned in equation
15Full results of optimal feedback coe¢cients for alternative preference speci…cations are available upon
request.
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(14). This covariance structure will be recovered by constructing a vector of output and
in‡ation shocks, namely ´t = [´1;t; :::::; ´11;t]
0 = L±t; "t = ["1;t; :::::; "11;t]0 = L¹t;, where
± » N(0; 1); and ¹ » N(0; 1).
There is only one nominal exchange rate and one nominal interest rate in the Euro area.
However, since in‡ation di¤erentials will remain, we have to calculate new real exchange
rate changes (with the use of equation (5) ; country speci…c price di¤erentials with respect
to the US and lagged Euro US interest rate di¤erentials will remain) and the changes in the
Euro/USD real exchange rate will be a weighted average of the changes in the post-Euro
real exchange rates.16
Secondly, estimated coe¢cients and optimal feedback rules derived from the previous
sections will be applied. Hence, the size and timing of the propagation of the monetary
shocks are allowed to be asymmetric. And thirdly, preferences are treated exogenously and
three types of output-in‡ation preferences will be considered. 17
4.2 Institutional Aspects: A Median Voter Model
In this section we will brie‡y sketch three potential scenarios of the ECB Governing Council.
The ECB consists of seventeen members. Eleven national representatives and six appointed
members (ECB Board) will vote upon the conduct of the monetary policy. We will assume
in each of the scenarios the median voter model will hold. In other words, among the
ordered total number of 17 votes, always the median vote (the 9th) will be executed as
the monetary policy decision (change in the interest rate) of the ECB. We will model the
voting process as given in De Grauwe et al. (1998). Formally we write the desired interest
rate of member countries as;
dt;j = ¡
³
Rj +B
0
jVjBj
´¡1 ³
U 0j +B
0
jVjAj
´
Xt;j ; (15)
We will rank the desired interest rates for each of the 17 members18 in ascending order,
to give the ordered sequence of desired interest rates d(1)t · d(2)t · ¢ ¢ ¢ · d(17)t : The ECB
Board proposes the interest rate;
dt;EMU =
11X
j=1
wjdt;j; (16)
where wj is the weight attached to country j; which is taken as the normalized share of the
16For that purpose we use weighted average (normalized capital share of the member countries at the
European Central Bank) of country speci…c real exchange rates. See footnotes 19 and 20. Note that cal-
culation of the Euro/USD real exchange rate changes have no implications on the simulations whatsoever.
17Three cases being medium (¸ = 1; ° = :5); high weight on output stabilization (¸ = 5; ° = :5) and low
weight on output stabilization (¸ = :2; ° = :5):
18Desired interest rates for permanent ECB members are obviously identical. More speci…cally they are
given by dt = iEt :
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capital of the national central banks in the ECB.19 The ninth member’s desired interest
rate is the Euroland interest rate.
In our …rst scenario, what we will call, the ECB Rule, the ECB Board members pose a
Euro-wide perspective. In other words, the ECB Board calculates a weighted average of the
desired interest rates across members countries and vote. At the same time, eleven national
representatives calculate their own countries’ desired interest rate and vote accordingly.
Among the 17 votes (6 ECB Board votes being the same) the median vote will be applied
as the Euro wide interest rate.
The second scenario, what we will call, the Nationalistic Rule, takes into account what
happens when the ECB Board members also take a nationalistic perspective. In that case
the votes for those countries that have an appointed member at the board doubles. Thus,
equation (15) holds for the appointed members as well and according to the majority voting
principle the median voter, i.e. 9 ¡ th member, gets its way. Again, the median voter’s
desired interest rate becomes the Euroland interest rate.20
Our third scenario intends to look at the e¤ect of a switch from …xed exchange rate
regime, like from the EMS to a monetary union. For that purpose we will incorporate a
new rule where the German desired interest rate becomes the Euro-wide interest rate. We
will call this rule the EMS Rule.
5 Simulation Results
We will use all the coe¢cients of the equations (1) ; (2) estimated and optimal feedback
rules for each individual country: Naturally, all simulations start at the steady state. In a
…rst instance, (since we deal with one common currency for the Euro area) i.i.d. random
(common) Euro/USD nominal exchange rate shocks arrive.21 These a¤ect the autoregres-
sive aggregate demand equation together with the country speci…c Cholesky …ltered output
gap shocks. In the following period, in‡ation levels are determined taking into considera-
tion the changes in the aggregate demand and country speci…c Cholesky …ltered in‡ation
shocks. Given the level of output gap, domestic and foreign in‡ation, foreign interest rate
and changes in the real exchange rate and with the use of the optimal feedback coe¢cients
all countries calculate their desired interest rates. After having observed the desired inter-
19These weights are a function of the country’s population and GDP in EMU-wide population and GDP.
As such they can be taken as relevant proxies for the weight each country gets in the decision taken by
a representative with an EMU-wide perspective. The weights are for Austria 0.0299, Belgium 0.0366,
Finland 0.0177, France 0.2138, Germany 0.3093, Ireland 0.0106, Italy 0.1896, Luxemburg 0.0019, The
Netherlands 0.0542, Portugal 0.0244 and Spain 0.1119.
20Note that appointed members consists of Finnish, French, German, Italian, Dutch and Spanish origin.
In other words, if these members defend the interest of their own country of origin, new weights have
to be calculated. These weights are for Austria 0.0588, Belgium 0.0588, Finland 0.1176, France 0.1176,
Germany 0.1176, Ireland 0.0588, Italy 0.1176, Luxemburg 0.0588, The Netherlands 0.1176, Portugal 0.0588
and Spain 0.1176. Hence, the country speci…c weights increase for the smaller countries and decline for
Germany, France and Italy in the nationalistic case.
21Remind that uncovered interest rate parity holds always.
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est rates of each individual country, the ECB Council decides for the Euro-wide interest
rate according to the voting schemes as speci…ed in Section 4:2. With the country speci…c
in‡ation rates we determine country speci…c post-Euro real exchange rates (assuming US
in‡ation and interest rates follow a random walk). Note that we decompose shocks on
the changes in the real exchange rate into the (Cholesky …ltered) country speci…c in‡ation
shocks and a common Euro/USD nominal exchange rate shock. These feed back to the
AD equation and so forth. To be able to compare three scenarios, we apply across all alter-
native voting schemes the same country speci…c shocks for in‡ation, output and nominal
exchange rates. We repeat our simulations for 5000 rounds.
5.1 Decided versus Desired Interest Rates
On the behavior of the interest rates there are mainly four points worth commenting. First
of all, decided interest rate exhibits a very smooth pattern. This result holds across di¤erent
preference speci…cations. In other words, our simulation results replicate the commonly
observed actual smooth interest rate behavior.
Secondly, as shown in table 5, under the ECB Rule countries’ desired interest rates are
more highly correlated with the decided interest rates than under the Nationalistic Rule.
In line with the …ndings of De Grauwe et al. (1998) we …nd that under the ECB Rule, ECB
Board members are able to impose their preferred interest rates on the ECB Governing
Council. In other words, 6 appointed members of the ECB Board de facto control the
European monetary policy.
Thirdly, the interest rate smoothing parameter seems to play a central role in the cal-
culated correlation between desired and decided interest rates. Countries with low degrees
of interest rate smoothing coe¢cients (as for example Belgium, Luxembourg and Portugal)
face a lower degree of correlation of their desired interest rates. Another observation is that
those countries, having a higher weight under the ECB Rule tend to gain most in terms
of the correlation. Furthermore, those large countries, in particular Germany, France and
Italy, facing a reduction in their voting power with the switch from the ECB Rule to the
nationalistic Rule, relatively lose in terms of the correlation of the desired and decided in-
terest rates. This feature of the correlations is not di¢cult to understand since the voting
power crucially a¤ects the decided interest rates.
insert here table 5
Moreover, this correlations decline overall as we switch from the preference speci…cation
in favor of low output stabilization (¸ = 0:2), to high output stabilization (¸ = 5): This
feature reveals the fact that the countries involved in the Euroland project tend to su¤er
from the monetary policy decisions of the ECB when the desire to stabilize output is
uniformly high.
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5.2 Post-Euro Real Exchange Rates
The changes in the real exchange rates do not seem to play a central role in the determi-
nation of the Euroland interest rate in our simulations. Remember that when we calculate
the post Euro real exchange rates we impose only a common nominal exchange rate shock
and an country speci…c in‡ation shocks. In other words, divergence of real exchange rates
can basically occur due to in‡ation divergence. Table 2 presents the results for simu-
lated volatility of the real exchange rates. ECB and EMS Rules imply a rather smooth
real exchange rate process when we compare with the Nationalistic Rule. However, as a
whole, the real exchange rate volatility is rather low meaning in‡ation rates do not diverge
substantially from eachother.
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Table 2: Volatility of Post Euro Real Exchange Rates
Aus Bel Fin Fra Ger Ire Ita Lux Net Por Spa
EMS .0043% .0041% .0043% .0043% .0044% .0043% .0044% .0043% .0040% .0041% .0043
ECB .0043% .0042% .0042% .0044% .0045% .0042% .0045% .0042% .0040% .0041% .0043
Nat .0061% .0060% .0061% .0064% .0065% .0060% .0063% .0060% .0058% .0059% .0062
There are potential some explanations for the weak impact of real exchange rates on
simulated macroeconomic aggregates. First of all, although we endogenize the real ex-
change rate process we do not model expectations as concerns the real exchange rates
and hence expectations for the future prices. Backward looking speci…cation of our model
implies that real exchange rates can have only an indirect e¤ect on the level of in‡ation
in individual countries. Note that in line with De Grauwe et al.(1998) we …nd much less
volatile in‡ationary environment than output across European countries. Naturally, price
di¤erentials do not exhibit substantial variation, hence real exchange rates. Secondly, our
set-up does not allow policy changes in the nominal exchange rate regime. In reality, how-
ever, nominal exchange rates are in the tool kit of the policymakers (although used less in
recent years). Further research will focus on the forward looking behavior of the agents.
5.3 Median Voters and Welfare Analysis
Table 6 presents the median voter results for the Nationalistic and ECB Rules. Under
the ECB Rule naturally the ECB Board is most frequent at the median and rather easily
impose its preferences. On the other hand, under the Nationalistic Rule some countries
position more frequently at the median. In particular, France, Netherlands, Spain, Italy
and Germany seem to locate more often at the mid-points of the ordered desired interest
rates.22 Recall that under the Nationalistic Rule these countries occupy two seats at the
ECB Governing Council. Although Finland has two seats at the GC, it becomes less often
median voter, probably implying its more divergent economic structure.
Throughout tables 7 to 9 we present the results for the relative welfare losses. Our
results suggest that the losses tend to increase the more countries attach weight to output
stabilization. Furthermore, the ECB Rule appears to be, in general, signi…cantly welfare
improving when the output stabilization desire is su¢ciently low. Basically, one can order
relative success of the voting schemes as follows: ECB Rule seems to perform better under
all preference speci…cations. Surprisingly, when incorporating changes in the real exchange
rates Nationalistic Rule seems to be superior to the EMS Rule. In other words, Euro-wide
perspective is in general welfare improving if our asymmetry speci…cations are plausible.
A comparison of country speci…c welfare changes (identi…ed as the weighted variability
of in‡ation, output and interest rates) across the voting schemes discussed above is rather
di¢cult. Our simulation results indicate that some countries gain and some lose with
alternative voting schemes. One can argue, however, almost all countries (naturally except
22see De Grauwe et al.(1998) fo the same result.
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Germany) prefer a weighting procedure to a dictated interest rate. Hence, the EMS Rule
is not preferred across the board. The same conclusion is rather di¢cult to reach when one
compares Nationalistic Rule with the ECB Rule. Some counties, such as France, Germany,
Italy, the Netherlands and Spain, clearly prefer ECB Rule (irrespective of their preferences)
to the Nationalistic one. Again this indicates large countries’ voting power and the result is
in line with the result of high correlation between desired and decided interest rates of large
countries as presented in Table 5. Relative voting power (ECB Rule/Nationalistic Rule) is
in general negatively correlated with the size of the relative losses (ECB Rule/Nationalistic
Rule).
insert here tables 6 to 9
6 Conclusions
In this paper we assess the monetary policy implications of the regime change in the open
economy Euroland and analyze the likely backward looking behavior of the ECB.
In a …rst step, we attempt to account for the asymmetries across the open economies
constituting the Euroland. For that purpose, we identify the asymmetries in economic
state, propagation mechanisms and output, in‡ation and exchange rate shock structures.
We provide the set-up where Central Banks are backwards looking. We derive the op-
timal monetary response of the Euroland countries, where the Central Banks take into
consideration the changes in the external competitiveness. Our proxy for the external
competitiveness is the changes in the real exchange rate vis-a-vis the US Dollar.
Our results can be summarized as follows. First of all, our estimation results suggest the
existence of asymmetries in size and timing in the monetary propagation mechanisms and
aggregate demand, aggregate supply and real exchange rate shocks. Generally, in‡ation
and output reactions with respect to policy changes tend to appear with the correct sign.
However, output reactions seem to dominate in‡ation reactions. In some countries we
account for the price puzzle.23
Secondly, incorporation of the real exchange rates complicates the analysis somewhat.
Introduction of the endogenous real exchange rates imply two opposing e¤ects at the same
time. The real interest rate channel and the real exchange rate channel. A positive shock
on the real exchange rates (either a foreign in‡ation shock or a foreign interest rate shock)
a¤ect in‡ation positively. In the following period, an increase in the in‡ation rate increases
the competitiveness via real interest channel however decreases the competitiveness via
real exchange rate channel. Thus our results are mixed. Output reactions are dominating
in‡ation reactions, however, the pattern of convergence with respect to a temporary shock
are di¤erent across countries.
Thirdly, output and in‡ation reactions with respect to aggregate demand and aggregate
supply shocks seem to converge rather quickly. Output reactions with respect to AD and
AS shocks exhibit the anticipated signs, however, in‡ation reactions are a¤ected by the
23In other words, the evidence provided by De Grauwe et al. (1998) is corroborated in the broadest
sense.
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price puzzle. In countries like Belgium, Ireland and Luxembourg we observe perverse
in‡ation reactions with respect to AD and AS shocks.
Second part of the paper contains a simulation analysis. We incorporate our empirical
accounts of asymmetries into a uni…ed set-up. Furthermore, we allow for three di¤erent
types of scenarios for the ECB Governing Council. The ECB Rule, the Nationalistic Rule
and the EMS Rule. Main results are in line with the …ndings of De Grauwe et al. (1998)
and are following:
Firstly, the ECB Rule tends to generate higher correlation between the desired interest
rates and decided interest rates than the Nationalistic Rule. Country speci…c voting power
a¤ects substantially the correlation between the desired and decided interest rates. Hence,
Germany and large countries tend to loose most under the Nationalistic voting scheme.
As a whole, correlations tend to decline with higher desire to stabilize output across the
board.
Secondly, median voters are those countries which have a high interest smoothing pa-
rameter in the optimal feedback rules and strong voting power at the GC.
Thirdly, losses tend to increase in line with the desire to stabilize output. The ECB
Rule is clearly superior to the two alternatives (the Nationalistic Rule and the EMS Rule)
Large countries tend to loose most with the switch from the ECB Rule to the Nationalistic
Rule. In general, countries seem to be better o¤ with a weighting procedure (the ECB or
the Nationalistic Rules) rather than a dictated rule (the EMS Rule).
In addition to these established results from the literature (De Grauwe et al.1998), we
…nd that incorporation of the post-Euro real exchange rates into the simulations do not
have very signi…cant e¤ect on the monetary policymaking. Divergences across country
speci…c real exchange rates are not very substantial. Basically, removal of the country
speci…c nominal exchange rates seems to trigger convergence across countries in terms of
output and in‡ations. The only source of potential divergence is due to in‡ation shocks
and seems to be rather weak.
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Appendix 1
Economic state is given by:
Xt = AXt¡1 +Bit¡1 + vt; (17)
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where ej is (n +m+ r + 4 + 11) vector all elements being zero except the j-th, which
is equal to one and ei:j is a (n+m+ r+ 4+ 11) vector with column i to j equals to 1=12.
On the other hand loss function is given by,
Yt = CXXt + Ciit;
where CX =
264 e1:12en+1
¡en+m+r+4+1
375 is a (3 x n +m+ r + 4 + 11) matrix and Ci =
264 00
1
375 is a
(3 x 1) vector. Note also that the preference matrix is de…ned as K =
264 1 0 00 ¸ 0
0 0 °
375 :
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Table 3: Correlation of desired and decided interest rates (in percentage)
Aus Bel Fin Fra Ger Ire Ita Lux Net Por Spa ECB
Low Output Stabilization Case
ECB Rule 61 70 55 89 93 81 78 55 84 64 80 99.4
Nationalistic 52 61 59 88 65 72 67 53 82 66 76 -
EMS Rule 92 90 89 97 100 98 95 88 97 89 96 -
Intermediate Output Stabilization Case
ECB Rule 41 31 41 77 91 60 68 12 79 56 72 98.4
Nationalistic 33 34 58 74 65 53 47 20 59 47 60 -
EMS Rule 75 69 85 93 100 94 84 58 96 21 90 -
High Output Stabilization Case
ECB Rule 23 29 38 63 87 22 43 5 52 37 37 98.3
Nationalistic 26 36 72 53 57 9 26 31 36 31 35 -
EMS Rule 29 30 64 78 100 54 60 27 83 16 53 -
Table 4: How Many Times Median Voter?All Preferences ( in percentage)
Aus Bel Fin Fra Ger Ire Ita Lux Net Por Spa ECB
Low Output Stabilization Case
ECB Rule 0.8 0.5 0.5 1.0 0.4 1.0 0.9 0.7 1.1 0.7 0.9 91.6
Nat Rule 3.5 7.6 3.5 23.4 6.1 9.1 8.1 5.6 15.6 5.4 12.4 -
Intermediate Output Stabilization Case
ECB Rule 1.3 1.1 1.5 3.3 0.5 0.9 2.6 0.6 3.7 1.7 1.5 81.3
Nat. Rule 4.3 5.1 5.7 24.9 5.2 8.2 10.0 4.5 13.2 6.8 12.2 -
High Output Stabilization Case
ECB Rule 1.4 0.6 1.5 2.8 0.1 1.6 1.6 0.9 1.7 1.1 2.1 84.7
Nat Rule 4.0 7.0 4.1 25.4 4.3 7.0 13.7 4.6 14.6 6.6 8.6 -
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Table 5: Relative Losses :Low Output Stabilization Case
Aus Bel Fin Fra Ger Ire Ita Lux Net Por Spa
EMS/ECB 167% 271% 109% 106% 92% 144% 153% 229% 150% 119% 115%
EMS/Nat 151% 235% 108% 97% 89% 129% 122% 217% 127% 128% 100%
ECB/Nat 91% 87% 99% 92% 97% 90% 79% 94% 85% 107% 87%
BM stands for Benchmark Rule, ECB stands for ECB Rule, Nat
stands for Nationalistic Rule and EMS stands for EMS Rule.
Table 6: Relative Losses : Intermediate Case
Aus Bel Fin Fra Ger Ire Ita Lux Net Por Spa
EMS/ECB 201% 288% 125% 109% 92% 136% 189% 351% 154% 138% 121%
EMS/Nat 227% 342% 133% 106% 81% 139% 170% 397% 148% 136% 121%
ECB/Nat 113% 119% 106% 97% 88% 102% 90% 113% 97% 98% 99%
Table 7: Relative Losses Higher Case
Aus Bel Fin Fra Ger Ire Ita Lux Net Por Spa
EMS/ECB 253% 484% 181% 215% 90% 369% 424% 496% 393% 237% 293%
EMS/Nat 231% 453% 159% 178% 78% 270% 305% 392% 288% 217% 224%
ECB/Nat 91% 94% 88% 83% 87% 73% 72% 79% 73% 92% 76%
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Figure 1: Output Response w.r.t. 1% Change in the Interest Rate
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Figure 2: In‡ation Response w.r.t. 1% Change in the Interest Rate
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Figure 3: Output Response w.r.t. 1% Change in the Real Exchange Rate
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Figure 4: In‡ation Response w.r.t. 1% Change in the Real Exchange Rate
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Figure 5: Output Response w.r.t. AS Shock
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Figure 6: In‡ation Response w.r.t. AS Shock
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Figure 7: Output Response w.r.t. AD Shock
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Figure 8: In‡ation Response w.r.t. AD Shock
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Figure 9: (First) Optimal In‡ation Coe¢cients
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Figure 10: (Firts) Optimal Output Coe¢cients
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Figure 11: (First) Optimal Real dExchange Rate Coe¢cients
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Figure 12: (First) Optimal Interest Smoothing Coe¢cients
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